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Abstract 
In this thesis we investigate the effects of monetary policies on the real side of the 
economy. The thesis consists of four essays, which are all based on models with money-
in-the-utility function (MIUF). In Essay I we study money growth rules. In Essays 11 - IV 
we focus on interest rate feedback rules. 
In Essay I we set up a model with endogenous time preference with decreasing 
impatience and study the dynamics of the economy and the possibility of money non-
neutrality. We find that money is non-neutral in that the monetary growth rate influences 
the real allocation. Furthermore, we show that stable dynamics can be consistent with 
decreasing impatience. 
In Essay II, in the model with endogenous time preference, we evaluate the stability 
properties of interest rate feedback rules. The important result is that active monetary 
policies do not necessarily guarantee equilibrium uniqueness. 
In Essay III we study the stability properties of interest rate rules in a discrete-time 
model. We show that whether real determinacy can occur depends not only upon how 
money enters preference, but also upon the "degree of activeness" of the monetary 
policies. 
In Essay IV we consider interest rate rules with a backward-looking component. We 
find that whether active backward-looking interest rate feedback rules are stabilizing 
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Essay I 
Endogenous Time Preference 
and Non-neutrality of Money 
Abstract 
In this essay we incorporate endogenous time preference into an MIUF model 
and study the dynamics of the economy and the possibility of money non-
neutrality. Unlike the extensively used hypothesis of positive relationship 
between current consumption and the rate of time preference, we assume 
that the households have decreasing impatience. We find that money is non-
neutral in that the monetary growth rate influences the real allocation such as 
consumption and capital stock. Furthermore, we show that stable dynamics 
can be consistent with decreasing impatience. 
1 
1 Introduction 
Recently there has been an increasing concern about the structure of time 
preference in studies of monetary growth models. The assumption of exoge-
nous time preference in the traditional framework, as pointed out by many 
researchers, is based on analytical convenience rather than strong economic 
intuition. Naturally previous conclusion of monetary neutrality derived from 
models with this restriction on the time preference (constant rate of time 
preference) as a central feature is highly questionable.^ 
Alternatively, the concept of recursive preference structure, allowing the 
rate of time preference to be endogenously determined, has been developed to 
reinforce the explanatory power of corresponding models. Uzawa (1968) first 
implements endogenous time preference in a continuous time infinite horizon 
optimal growth model to demonstrate monetary non-neutrality. Extended 
and clarified by Epstein and Hynes (1983), this kind of recursive preference 
structure has been widely employed in models of monetary growth. 2 
iSee Sidrauski's rational choice model for an example of money neutrality. Sidraouski 
(1967a, b) assumes exogenous time preference and proves equality and invariance between 
the steady state rate of time preference, the real interest rate and the marginal product 
of capital. 
2 Epstein (1983) formulates a class of utility functionals in which rates of time preference 
depend on future consumption and illustrates the importance of the structure of the rate of 
time preference. Hayakawa (1992) studies the effect of monetary expansion on steady-state 
capital and social welfare in cash-in-advance and money-in-the-utility function models. 
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In this essay we incorporate endogenous time preference into a money-in-
the-utility function (MIUF) model and study the dynamics of the economy 
and the possibility of money non-neutrality. Unlike the extensively used hy-
pothesis of positive relationship between current consumption and the rate of 
time preference, we assume that the households have decreasing impatience. 
Specifically, we assume that the rate of time preference is a decreasing func-
tion of the economy-wide average level of consumption or average level of 
real balances. 
Uzawa's assumption of positive relationship between current consumption 
level and the rate of time preference is questionable on intuitive grounds. This 
contradicts the general behavior that rich people are more patient. According 
to Blanchard and Fisher (1989), this assumption is "not particularly attrac-
tive as a description of preferences and is not recommended for general use." 
In this aspect, decreasing marginal impatience appears to be intuitively more 
appealing. Becker and Mulligan (1997) provide theoretical support for de-
creasing marginal impatience in their model where rich households are more 
patient, as they will invest more in future-oriented capital. Some empirical 
justification for decreasing impatience has been provided by Lawrence (1991) 
and Smwick (1998). Lawrence (1991) uses the Panel Study of Income and 
3 
Dynamics dataset to show that the subjective rates of time preference of the 
poorer households are three to five percentage points higher than those for 
the richest families. Using the wealth data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Sam wick (1998) shows that the estimated rates of time preference 
decline with income level, which indicates that rich people are more patient 
to favor on future consumption. 
In our model the optimal monetary growth rule is characterized by the 
optimal combination of consumption and real balances at steady states. Pre-
vious research such as Hayakawa (1992) has found that an increase of mone-
tary growth raises the opportunity cost of holding real balances and renders 
the initial equilibrium too costly. This increases the real interest rate and 
decreases the demand for real balances, which in turns increases savings and 
the capital stock. However, according to our assumption, the rate of time 
preference increases in response, indicating that the household becomes more 
impatient and consumes more at current time, which in turn holds back the 
accumulation of capital or even cut down the capital stock . Thus the ef-
fect of monetary growth rate on the real allocation can be either positive or 
nagative. 
Furthermore, we show that the stability of equilibrium does not necessar-
4 
ily require increasing impatience, which is generally believed as not only a 
sufficient condition for equilibrium determinacy but a necessary one. 3 In this 
essay we find that a stable steady state can be consistent with decreasing 
impatience. This result is consistent with that of Mausumi Das (2003), who 
demonstrates, with a growth model without money, that a negative relation-
ship between the instantaneous discount rate and the household's current 
consumption does not necessarily result in instability of the dynamic system. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the 
basic framework of the model. In Section 3 we characterize the steady-state 
equilibrium and discuss the money non-neutrality with comparative static 
analysis. In Section 4 we study the stability properties of the equilibrium 
dynamics. In Section 5 we provide the concluding remarks. 
2 The Model 
Households. - With the typical assumption of identical households, we carry 
out our analysis in terms of a representative household which maximize the 
3see Epstein (1987a, pp. 73) and Shi and Epstein (1993，pp. 66). 
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discounted value of their utility over infinite horizon. 
oo t 
U = j n(c",mj"° ')exp[- J p(dy, my)dv]dt (1.1) 
0 0 
where q and rrit denote the per capita consumption and real balance respec-
tively in period t 
The instantaneous utility function u{-,-) is a real-valued and twice con-
tinuously differentiable function satisfying the usual properties of a utility 
function: w(•，•) > 0, Wc > 0, Um > 0, Ucc < 0, Umm < 0. 
p{ct, rht) denotes the instantaneous discount rate which depends on the 
economy-wide average level of consumption c and real balance m at time t] 
For simplicity, we assume p{ct, rht) = -f 0 < 0, ^ > 0. Here 6' < 0 
indicates the decreasing marginal impatience. 
The constraint of the household is 
kt + mt = f(kt) - c t - TTtmt (1.2) 
where k is the real capital stock, tt is the inflation rate. f{h) is the 
production function through which the household-firm transforms capital 
into final goods, and with the following properties: 
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Assumption The 'production function yt 二 /{h) is strictly increasing 
and strictly concave, that is, f'{kt) > 0 > f"{kt) 
Here we assume the population growth rate and the depreciation rate on 
the existing capital stock to be zero. 
Defining the total wealth of the household as at — ht-\-饥亡，we rewrite the 
constraint of the household as 
dt = - mt) - c t - iTtrrit (1.3) 
Therefore, we can analyze the representative household's optimization 
problem by formulating the present-value Hamiltonian as 
t 
H = w ( c 『， e x p [ — J p{cy, Thy)dv] + \ lf{at — rut) — Ct - TTtrrit] 
0 
\ is the co-state variable. 
The household chooses sequences for q, rrit and at to maximize its life-
time utility. The rate of time preference is taken as given for it only depends 
on average consumption and average real balance. Then we have the first-
7 
order condition associated with the maximization problem: 
t 




\ = - v m ) (1.6) 
together with the TVC condition 
Defining 小^ =入t exp[- / p(cy, m^Jdv], we have 会 = 令 + p(石’ m^). Thus 
J 0 ‘ 
we can further rewrite Equations (1.4) and (1.6) as 
u 'acr 'ml- '^ = (/>, (1.7) 
^ - p { c t , m t ) = - f ' { k t ) (1.8) 
Government. - Assume that the government issues money at a fixed rate 
8 
fi, that is, 
Mt 二 ^iMt (1.9) 
Prom Equation (1.9) we can derive 
m Mt Pt ,1 1 … 
— = j y =fJ'-7rt (1.10) 
m Mt Pt 
3 Non-neutrality of Money 
In this section we characterize the optimal monetary growth rule by the opti-
mal combination of consumption and real balances at steady states. A com-
parative static analysis shows that money is non-neutral in that the monetary 
growth rate influences the real allocation such as consumption and capital 
stock. But the ultimate effect is ambiguous. 
Equation (1.5) implies that 
TT, ^ — ^ - f ' ( h ) (1.11) 
(X mt ‘ 
9 
Substituting Equation (1.11) into Equation (1.10), we have 
rht = mtifi + f'ih) — — ( 1 . 1 2 ) 
a rrit 
In equilibrium we have q = q, rht — rrit as individual and average 
variables are identical. Together with the market-clearing conditions kt 二 
f{kt) — Cf, we have at the steady state 
f(k*) - c* = 0 (1.13) 
f'{k*) = e { c T + c (1.14) 
— + (1.15) 
a m* ^ ‘ 
where the superscript * denotes the steady-state value and the same in what 
follows. 
Note that from Equation (1.14) the marginal product of capital is trans-
formed into an endogenous factor when time preference is assumed to be 
recursive. To make our point clear, consider the case when the rate of time 
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preference is a constant p. Equation (1.14) is rewritten as 
m ) = -p (1.16) 
from which a unique steady-state capital stock is determined independently. 
Therefore monetary fluctuation is not transferred to the real economy, thus 
we attain money neutrality. 
A comparative static analysis on Equations (1.13) and (1.14) and the 
market-clearing condition against /jl at steady state yields the following: 
1 - / ' 0 dc*/dfj. 0 
結 -f" d 喻 = 1 
-Oa (cT—i f" -9(1 — a) {c*^ (m*)—� 0 
- J 」 L _ 
(1.17) 
By denoting D as the determinant of the coefficient matrix in (1.17), we 
have 
D = e[l-a) {cr i f m - + / � * ) 而 
The first part of D is positive while the second is negative, thus the sign 
11 
of D is ambiguous, depending on which part will dominate. 
As the determinant is non-zero, the effects of money growth can be ob-
tained by applying Cramer's Rule: 
dc*/dii = -f'(k*)e{l - a) (cT K ) - " ID (1.18) 
dmr/dix = -f" + ea{cT~'(m卞 VD (1.19) 
dk”d4i = -e{l - a) {c*y (m*)-" f[k*)/D (1.20) 
For D > 0, we have dc*/dfi > 0, dk*/dfi > 0, the sign of dm*/d^ is am-
biguous. Thus an increase of the monetary growth rate increases the steady-
state consumption and capital intensity. While the effect on the steady-state 
real balances is ambiguous. 
For D < 0, we have dc*丨dyi < 0, dk*/dfi < 0, dm*/dji > 0. Thus an 
expansion of the monetary growth rate brings a decrease in the steady-state 
consumption and capital intensity, and an increase in the real balances. 
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4 Equilibrium Dynamics 
In this section, we study the dynamics of the system. We find that there 
exists the possibility that the equilibrium is uniquely determined. Thus a 
stable steady state can be consistent with decreasing impatience. 
By taking log of Equation (1.7) and differentiating with respect to time 
we have 
^ i m 广 " + (1 - + (a - 1 ) - + (1 - a ) — - • (1.21) 
u' Ct mt cpi 
Assuming the utility function as it = � ‘ ——，we rewrite Equation 
(1.21) as 
- a ( c ? m广 a) - i (c<m广“么+ ( 1 — 广 + —1 卢 + ( l - a ) � = ^ 
Ct rrit Ct mt (Pt 
(1.22) 
which can be simplified as 
1 ) ^ + (1 — a) ( l — … � = j (1.23) 
Ct 饥 t <Pt 
Substituting Equations (1.8) and (1.12) into Equation (1.23) to solve for c 
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and noting that in equilibrium, individual and average variables are identical, 
we have 
a — aa — 1 
-(1 - a)(l - a)mt(f(k) — + ⑷） (1.24) 
Therefore Equations (1.12) and (1.24) and the market-clearing condition 
describe the adjustment path involving three variables c, k and m. The 
capital stock k is given at any point in time (a predetermined or sluggish 
variable)，while both m and c can jump at any point in time (jump variables). 
By linearizing the three equations around the steady state we have 
Ct cLii an ai3 (k — c* 
h = —1 f'(k*) 0 kt - k* 
rht [ m*/�(fc*) mt-m* 
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where 
an 二 ^ - ~ ( - M c T K ) I - � ( 1 _ ^ - 0 C * ) 
1 + era — a am* 
- = ( 1 - 1 : ) ( 二 + v ' � 
a . = � 2、2 
l + crcb — li- aa- a a (m*) 
By denoting J as the Jacobian matrix in Equation (1.17), we have 
, , T � -Oa (c*)" (m*”—" (1 - a)ac* ^ � 
trace{J) = ~ - + t t T — � r + f (k) 
l-\-aa- a (1 + cro; - a) am* �丨 
det(J) 二 0(1 - a) ( c T + i (m*)-" [ m * f - - f ) + (1 - � ‘ f " 
a am* 
As f'{k) > 0，f"{k) < 0，0 < a < 1, 0 < a < 1’ 61 < 0, We have 
trace(J) > 0 
The first part of det( J) is positive while the second part is negative, thus 
the sign of det(J) is ambiguous, depending on which part will dominate. 
If det( J) < 0, there is one negative and two positive eigenvalues, so that 
the equilibrium is uniquely determined. This implies that the stability of 
equilibrium does not necessarily require increasing impatience, and that a 
stable steady state can be consistent with decreasing impatience. 
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5 Conclusion 
To explore the effect of the monetary growth rate on the dynamics of the econ-
omy, we examine in this essay an MIUF monetary model on the assumption 
of endogenous time preference. In our model the rate of time preference is 
transformed into an endogenous variable which depends on the economy-wide 
average level of consumption and real balances. This assumption restores the 
link between the real and monetary sectors. The real interest rate is deter-
mined by an interaction of monetary and portfolio decisions. Therefore a 
change of monetary growth rate affects not only inflation and real balance 
holdings but also real sector variables such as consumption and the capital 
stock. We find that money is non-neutral in that the monetary growth rate 
influences real allocation such as consumption and capital stock. 
In the presented model the rate of time preference varies inversely with 
the economy-wide average level of consumption and real balances, which 
states that rich people are more patient. We get different result from previ-
ous research such as Hayakawa (1992) which assumes increasing impatience. 
Hayakawa (1992) points out that an increase of the monetary growth rate 
decreases the steady-state real balances, while increase the steady-state con-
sumption and capital intensity. However, with the assumption of decreasing 
16 
impatience, we find that the dynamics of the economy is ambiguous. 
A related contribution of the essay is the demonstration that the gen-
eral accepted remark that increasing impatience is a necessary condition for 
stability of equilibrium is false. We find that there exists the possibility of 
saddle-path stability on the assumption of decreasing impatience. Thus we 
enhance the robustness of the result in Mausumi Das (2003). 
17 
Essay II 
Endogenous Time Preference 
and Interest Rate Feedback 
Rules 
Abstract 
In this essay we evaluate the stability properties of interest rate rules in 
the framework of an MIUF model under the assumption of endogenous time 
preference. We first analyze an endowment economy with a simplified interest 
rate feedback rule in which the nominal interest rate only depends on the 
inflation rate. The important result is that endogenous time preference may 
open the door to equilibrium indeterminacy so that active monetary policies 
do not necessarily guarantee local uniqueness of the rational expectations 
equilibrium. The result is robust to the extended model with capital. 
18 
1 Introduction 
John Talor (1993) proposes a type of interest rate feedback rule whereby the 
central bank sets the nominal interest rate as a function of some measure of 
inflation and the level of aggregate activity and provides empirical justifica-
tion for this modeling strategy. Since then this type of monetary policies has 
been in widely use in analysis of monetary model. Most research on the rela-
tionship between the degree to which monetary policies respond to inflation 
rate and macroeconomic stability reaches a general result: stability is easier 
to get under active monetary policies, that is, an interest rate feedback rule 
with more than one percent increase in nominal interest rate responding to 
one percent increase in inflation; while equilibrium indeterminacy may arise 
under passive monetary policies, where less than one percent increase in the 
nominal interest rate is undertaken as a reaction to one percent increase in 
inflation rate. 
In this essay we evaluate the stabilizing properties of general interest rate 
feedback rules in the framework of an MIUF model under the assumption of 
endogenous time preference. This stands in contrast to previous literature 
where the rate of time preference is set as a constant. In our model the rate 
of time preference of the representative household is characterized as a "so-
19 
cial impatience index", which is a decreasing function of the economy-wide 
average level of consumption and average real balances (or aggregate values 
of these variables with a population of unit mass). Incorporating aggregate 
variables into individual time preference represents a simple and tractable 
approach of modeling social and cultural influence. This formulation cap-
tures the actual existing social forces and its large influence on individual 
behavior, and has been extensively discussed in literature" .^ 
In Section 2 we analyze a money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) endow-
ment economy with a simplified interest rate feedback rule in which the 
nominal interest rate only depends on the inflation rate. For simplicity, we 
restrict attention to a positive cross partial between consumption and real 
balances {ucm > 0，i.e., consumption and money are complements). As the 
time preference is endogenous, the real interest rate is determined by an inter-
action of monetary and portfolio decisions, thus the changes in the monetary 
policies affects real economy. The critical outcome is that endogenous time 
preference may open the door to equilibrium indeterminacy so that active 
monetary policies do not necessarily guarantee local uniqueness of the ra-
4 Shi (1999) postulates that individual time preference replies on average consumption 
habit, and Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2003) place average felicity in the discounting func-
tion. Ogawa (1993) assumes that individual time preference depends on average labor 
income. 
20 
tional expectations equilibrium. This is a new challenge to the result of 
Benhabib et al (2001). In the context of an MIUF model but with a fixed 
rate of time preference, Benhabib et al. show that the standard result holds 
in an endowment economy with consumption and real balances being com-
plements, that is, active monetary policies ensure uniqueness of equilibrium 
and passive monetary policies bring multiple equilibria. 
In Section 3 we extend the model by appending endogenous investment. 
The rate of time preference of the representative household depends on the 
economy-wide average level of consumption and level of wealth instead of 
real balances. The result is robust to this extension. We conclude this essay 
in Section 4. 
2 Endowment Economy 
2.1 The Model 
Households. - The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely 
lived households. The households are identical in terms of preferences and 
endowments. A typical household can hold his wealth in the form of either 
21 
money or nominal bonds and maximize its lifetime utility 
oo t 
1 u(Ct, rrit) exp[— j my)dv]dt (2.1) 
‘ ° "o 
subject to the budget constraint 
bt + mt = y + ( R t - 7rt)bt — Thmt - C t - u (2.2) 
where at time t, rrit is the stock of real balances, q the per capita consump-
tion, Tt the lump-sump taxes, tt^  the expected inflation rate, tt^  equals the 
actual inflation rate at time t under our perfect foresight assumption. 
We assume that the household's instantaneous utility function u(Ct, rrit) 
is a twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave function with the 
normal properties that is, Uc > 0, Um > 0, Ucc < 0, Umm < 0. For simplicity 
we assume Ucm > 0. 
p{ct, rht) is the instantaneous discount rate which depends on the economy-
wide average level of consumption c and real balances rh . In this model, we 
assume that p{c, fh) takes a linear form as 
p(ct, rht) = och + Prht + 7 (2.3) 
22 
where o; > 0, < 0. Here a > 0 captures the individual's behavior to "keep 
up with the Joneses" in consumption, that is, high average consumption 
induces the agent to be more impatient toward future consumption and con-
sume more at present. With the assumption ^ < 0, we try here to model the 
case where individual time preference falls with the level of the economy's 
wealth standard. It is reasonable to say that individual attitude toward 
weighing present versus future happiness is largely influenced by the society. 
The society's valuation of future utility, in turn, increases with its wealth 
standard. 
Defining total wealth as at = bt + rrit^  the household's budget constraint 
can be written as 
at=y + (Rt- TTt)at — Rtrut - ct — n (2.4) 
There is also the noPonzi-game borrowing limit of the form 
> 0 (2.5) 
t —^ OO 
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The corresponding present-value Hamiltonian is 
t 
H = u{ct, mt) exp[- J my)dv] + Xtly + {Rt - Th�(h — Rtrut — q - n ] 
0 
where \ is the costate variable. 
The first-order conditions are 
t 
Uc{ct, mt) exp[- J p{cy, my)dv\ = Xt (2.6) 
0 
t 
Um{ct,mt)exp[- J my)dv\ = XtRt (2.7) 
0 
入 t = -Xt{Rt — TTt) (2.8) 
together with the TVC condition 
lim e - = 0 (2.9) 
Defining (f)^ 二 Xt exp[- J p{cy, 'my)dv], we have = ^ + rht). Thus 
we can further rewrite the first-order conditions as 
Uc(ct,mt) = (l)t (2.10) 
24 
UnJ^Ct,mt) = (ptlit (2.11) 
与 = m ) + 7rt-Rt (2.12) 
Government. - Following Benhalbib et al. (1998), we assume that mone-
tary policies take the form as interest rate feedback rules where the nominal 
interest rate Rt is set as a non-decreasing function of the inflation rate tt^ . 
Rt = R{nt) (2.13) 
where R{；Kt) is a continuous, non-decreasing and strictly positive function, 
and there exists at least one it* > -p such that R{7r*) = p-\-7T*. The monetary 
policies are active if R'{7r*) > 1 and passive if R'{7T*) < 1 . 
The government budget constraint is 
at = {Rt — 7rt)at — Rtirit - Tt (2.14) 
2.2 Equilibrium Dynamics 
In this section, we study the dynamics of the system. Our result is that 
equilibrium indeterminacy is more likely to occur when the influence of social 
25 
forces on individual time preference is strong. 
With the goods market clear conditions c = y, Equations (2.10) and 
(2.11) can be solved for mt and tt^  as functions of (p” 
mt = 771 � (2.15) 
7rt = 7r � (2.16) 
where 
= 丄 > 0 
Ucm 
/ 収mm —丑以cm ^ r^  
冗= " " “ 2 D,“ < 0 
(PUcmR' 
In equilibrium, we have Ct = q, rht — mt . By substituting Equations 
(2.15) and (2.16) into Equation (2.12) we have 
•<h =小t [oiy + 隨 t ) + 7 + • 一 RM) (2.17) 
Equation (2.17) is a differential equation that must be obeyed by paths for 
real balances (determined by </>) that are consistent with rational expectations 
26 
equilibrium. Linearizing this equation around the steady state we have 
= 办” (2.18) 
where A = (</>*) + (1 - R')n'{(j)*)) 
When (1 — R') > 0, it is easy to see that ^ < 0 , there are a con-
tinuum of equilibrium trajectories that converge to the steady state. Thus 
we have equilibrium indeterminacy when the government implements passive 
monetary policies. 
For (1 — R') < 0, that is, under active monetary policies, the first part of 
A is negative while the second part is positive, so the sign of A is ambiguous. 
For detailed analysis we rewrite A as 
A = + (2.19) 
Ucm[(P ) 
where 
H* 二 饥饥(0*) - R ( f y u c m { f ) ) > 0 
With the assumption Ucm > 0, Equation (2.19) implies that whether there 
is equilibrium indeterminacy or uniqueness depends on the value of /? + if *. 
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If ^ < —//*, then < 0, equilibrium indeterminacy therefore arises. While 
\i (3 > —H*, then > 0, thus the equilibrium is uniquely determined. Since 
1/31 measures the dependence of individual time preference on average wealth 
standard, we can say that equilibrium indeterminacy is more likely to occur 
when the influence of social forces on individual time preference is strong. 
3 Extended Model with Capital 
In this section we investigate an extended model with capital accumulation. 
For simplicity, we assume that the utility function is separable in consump-
tion and real balance. We find that as indeterminacy remains possible under 
active monetary policies, our previous result is robust to this extension. 
3.1 The Model 
Households. - The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely 
lived families. In addition to money a typical household can hold nominal 
bonds and physical capital. The nominal bonds pay the nominal interest rate 
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Rt > 0. The household maximizes its life-time utility in the following form 
U = j (In ct + In m^) exp[- j p{cy, jhy + ky)dv]dt (2.20) 
0 0 
subject to 
kt + mt + bt = f{kt) + {Rt - 7rt)bt — Thmt - Ct - n (2.21) 
where we utilize the same technology function in this model, and assume 
population growth rate and depreciation rate to be zero. 
p{ct, rhi + ki) is the instantaneous discount rate which depends on the 
average level of consumption c^，real balances m^ and capital stock kt. We 
assume that p(c, rh + k) takes a linear form as 
/)(ct, rht + h ) = act + /? {mt + k ) + 7. (2.22) 
where q : > 0 , / 3 < 0 , 7 > 0 
Defining the total wealth of the household as at = bt kt mt’ the 
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household's budget constraint can be rewritten into 
at = fih) + {Rt - 7Tt)at -{Rt- 7h)k’t - Rtirit — Q — n (2.23) 
The corresponding present value Hamiltonian is 
t 
H 二（ I n c d lnmt)exp[—y p ( ‘ rfiy + k^)dv\ 
0 
[f{kt) + (Rt - 7Tt)cLt - (Rt - 7Tt)kt - Rtirit - Q - Tt] 
where Xt is the costate variable. 
The representative household chooses sequences for q, m ,^ kt and a^  to 
maximize its life-time utility, taking as given a。，the time paths of Tt, Rt and 
TTt. The first-order conditions for optimality are : 
t 




— e x p [ - / p(cy, m^ + ky)dv\ = RtXt (2.25) 
讯t J 
0 
/'(/ct) — + = 0 (2.26) 
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At = -Xt{Rt - TTf) (2.27) 
together with the TVC condition 
/。'[风 ⑴ = 0 (2.28) 
Following the method above, we define a new cost ate variable 小尤= 
Xt exp[- / /9(cy, TUy + ky)dv] and rewrite the first-order conditions as 
./ 0 
- = (2.29) 
— = R t ( k (2.30) mt 
. t = + (2.31) 
Government. - We follow the interest rate feedback rule described in 
Equation (2.13) 
31 
3.2 Equilibrium dynamics 
From Equations (2.13) and (2.26), we can solve ixt as a function of kt 
TTt = n{kt) (2.32) 
where 7T'{kt) = —f"/{l — R'). It is easy to see that tt' > 0 for passive monetary 
policies and tt' < 0 for active monetary policies. 
From Equations (2.29) and (2.30) , we have 
Q = x (2.33) 
mt = , (2.34) 
where 
⑷=—： ^ < 0 (2.35) 
0 
等 - • 〈 。 (2.36) 
等 - 第 (2.37) 
Notice that once solutions for kt and are obtained, other variables 
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can be determined backward . Thus it suffices to consider the equilibrium 
paths by which {j^t, ^t) converge to a steady-state ((f)*, k*). Together with 
the goods market clear condition kt = f{kt) — Q � the dynamic paths of (f) and 
k are determined by the following dynamic system 
k = fih) - c(M (2.38) 
•<t>t = M a c � + kt) + (3h + 7 - f'(h)) (2.39) 
Linearizing Equations (2.38) and (2.39) to obtain 
kt kt — k* 
二 A 
where the Jacobian matrix A is 
作 *) -cMn 
A = 
The determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
—…+ 摊 + 旁—1) 33 
trace{A) = f + 作c小沙*�+ 13m认f, k*)) 
We can see that both signs of trace(A) and det(^) are ambiguous. Since 
there is one predetermined variable and one jump variable in the dynamic 
system, the equilibrium uniqueness requires that there is one and only one 
negative real root or one complex root with negative real part. An example 
is that when det(^) < 0. Therefore it is possible for indeterminacy to arise 
under the active monetary policy. 
4 Conclusion 
In this essay, we have incorporated endogenous time preference to explore the 
stability properties of the interest rate feedback rules. The model captures 
social and cultural influence to explore the effect of the interest rate feedback 
rules on the dynamics of the economy. For simplicity, we only study the case 
when consumption and real balances are complements. 
We first study the MIUF model where the economy is endowed with out-
put y. We find that the inclusion of endogenous time preference destabilizes 
the economy by generating equilibrium indeterminacy under active mone-
tary policy. Thus active monetary policies do not necessarily guarantee local 
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uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. As we have pointed out, 
this stands contrast to the result obtained in Benhabib et al. (2001). With a 
fixed rate of time preference, they show that active monetary policies ensure 
uniqueness of equilibrium and passive monetary policies bring multiple equi-
libria when consumption and real balances are complements. However, in 
our model the social forces play an important role in equilibrium dynamics. 
When the influence of social forces on individual time preference is sufficiently 
strong, equilibrium indeterminacy occurs under active interest rate rules. In 
the extended model we add endogenous investment into the economy. As 
indeterminacy remains possible under active monetary policies, our result is 
robust to this extension. 
Taylor (1993) gives theoretical support for why active monetary policies 
are stabilizing. He points out that if the central bank raises nominal interest 
rates by more than one percent as a response to a one percent increase in 
inflation, the real interest rates increases. These higher real interest rates 
tend to slowdown aggregate demand thereby curbing inflationary pressures. 
However, when we assume the rate of time preference to be endogenous, the 
real interest rate is determined by an interaction of monetary and portfolio 
decisions. When the influence of social forces on individual time preference 
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is sufficiently strong, aggregate demand will increase, which in turn will give 
rise to higher inflation. That explains how the inclusion of endogenous time 
preference affects the dynamics and stability of the real side of the economy. 
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Essay III 
Interest Rate Rules and 
Indeterminacy in a 
Discrete-Time Monetary Model 
Abstract 
In this essay, we examine the validity of the conventional result about equi-
librium stability and interest rate feedback rules by applying a discrete-time 
MIUF model in an endowment economy. With similar fundamental assump-
tions, we obtain in this essay a few but importantly different results than 
those obtained in a continuous-time model in Benhabib, et al. (2001a). 
Specifically, we show that whether real determinacy can occur depends not 
only upon whether consumption and money are complements or substitutes, 
but also upon the “degree of activeness" of the monetary policies at which 
the monetary authority implements. 
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1 Introduction 
In this essay, we examine the validity of the outstanding result about equi-
librium stability and interest rate feedback rules by applying a discrete-time 
MIUF model in an endowment economy. The analysis here is parallel to 
the continuous-time model of Benhabib, et al. (2001a). In the context of a 
flexible price, MIUF model in a continuous time infinite horizon, they show 
that when output is assumed to be a positive constant, whether particular 
monetary policies generate macrostability depends crucially on the way in 
which money is assumed to enter preferences. They obtain the standard re-
sult when consumption and real balances are complements in preference in 
the sense that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in real bal-
ances. However, when consumption and real balances are substitutes, they 
find that the result is opposite, that is, equilibrium indeterminacy occurs 
under active monetary policies while uniqueness of the equilibrium occurs 
under passive monetary policies. Thus the commonly believed properties of 
interest rate feedback policies are challenged. 
In a discrete-time framework with similar fundamental assumptions, we 
obtain in this essay a few but importantly different results from those of 
continuous-time model as in Benhabib, et al. (2001a). Specifically, we show 
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that whether real determinacy can occur depends not only upon whether 
consumption and money are complements or substitutes, but also upon the 
“degree of activeness" of the monetary policies at which the monetary au-
thority implements. 
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present 
the basic theoretical framework. In Section 3 we characterize the steady-state 
equilibria and study the equilibrium dynamics. In Section 4 we provide the 
concluding remarks and discuss possible extensions of our research. 
2 The Model 
Households. - The household's lifetime utility is given by 
t 崎 , 令 、 ( 3 . 1 ) 
where ^ < 1 is the discount factor, q consumption, Mt nominal money 
balances held by the household, Pt the nominal rice level, and 脊 real balances 
held by household. 
In addition to money, the household can hold nominal bonds Bt which 
pay the nominal interest rate it > 0. Suppose the household receives a fixed 
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endowment stream and pays real lump-sum taxes r. The household's 
budget constraint can be written as 
The state variables are ^ ^ and The household chooses sequences 
for Ct’ 贊 and 骨 so as to maximize Equation (3.1) subject to Equation (3.2) 
and the following noPonzi-game condition 
� 0 (3.3) 
In order to make our points clear, we use the following form of utility 
function, 
脊 ) 二 1 ^ [ 々 ( 誓 ) 1 1 - a (3-4) 
The Hamiltonian associated with the household's maximization problem 
is 
Z^P 1 - [ ^ t J + At(Q + 2/-r + — 7—-5- ) 
t=i \1 - cr Ft Pt l-\-Zt Pt Pt J 
(3.5) 
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We obtain the following optimality conditions as following 
… - i ( 婴 … ( 3 . 6 ) 
pt f ( l — … ( 尝 … ( 1 - … — A,) + � = 0 (3.7) 
一 � A � ( 3 . 8 ) 
t^oo Pt 
Dividing Equation (3.7) by Equation (3.6), and by using Equation (3.8), 
we have 
宇 跡 （3.9) 
From Equation (3.6) we can derive 
广 幼 i - � ) = A � (3.10) 
Dividing Equation (3.6) by Equation (3.10), and by using Equation (3.8), 
we get 
/ Ml \ (1 - … / \ a-l-aa jj 
( # ) fe) + (3.11) 
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Government. - Under interest rate feedback rules, monetary authority 
sets nominal interest rate according to 
h = fM 
where TTt = is the inflation rate. The functional form or property of 
/(•) is discussed below. 
3 Equilibrium Dynamics 
In this section we study the dynamics of the system. We find that whether 
real determinacy can occur depends not only upon whether consumption and 
money are complements or substitutes, but also upon the "degree of active-
ness" of the monetary policies at which the monetary authority implements. 
With the goods market clear condition Ct =仏 Equations (3.9) and (3.11) 
can be rewritten as 
Mt ,1 一 a � f l + i t \ , � • 二 (丁 ) ( f ( 3 . 1 2 ) 
/ Ml \ 
^ ^ J + (3.13) 
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At the steady state, the RHS of Equation (3.13) equals 1, that is 
广=/(兀 *) = ( } - 1 ) + }兀* (3.14) 
Note the important difference of Equation (3.14) from that in continuous-
time model. The coefficient of tt* in the RHS of Equation (3.14) is now 
奏〉1，whereas it is 1 in the continuous-time model. It is this difference that 
contrasts the following results to those obtained in continuous-time models. 
The intuition for Equation (3.14) is the following: At the steady state, 
due to the presents of money in the utility function and the discount factor /?, 
it is not enough to compensate bond holders with only tt* because of inflation. 
Rather, they have to be compensated with ^tt*. This effect is not present in 
continuous-time model. Once again, in order to make the point clear, and 
as has been done by many authors, we assume the economy is near steady 
state and the interest feedback rules /(•) takes the following linear form 
it = /W = + ^TTt + fi{7Tt - TT*) (3.15) 
where /i may be positive, negative or zero, and the value of which indicates 
the degree of "activeness" or "passiveness" of monetary policies. Also, we 
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assume it is an increasing function of ttj, i.e., ^ + /i > 0 
Using Equations (3.12), (3.13) and (3.15) to linearize the resulting equa-
tion at the steady state (see Appendix), we get the following difference equa-
tion 
‘ TTt+i - TT* = A(7rt - TT*) (3.16) 
where 
If ^ > 1, there exists a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the 
real allocation converges to the steady state. If ^ < 1, the real allocation is 
indeterminate ( assume /i, is mall enough so that > 0) 
Prom Equation (3.15)，we say monetary authority implements active 
monetary policies when > 1, and passive monetary policies when < 
1 using Leeper's terminology (1991), By using Equations (3.15)，(3.16) and 
(3.17) we can obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that consumption and money are complements 
(a < 1 or Ucm >0」，Then, if the monetary 'policy is active when ^ + fj, > 1 
and /i > 0, there exists a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the real 
allocation converges to the steady state. If the monetary policy is active when 
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i + / i � 1 but fi < 0 (moderately active), the real allocation is indeterminate. 
On the other hand, if the monetary policy is passive when ^ fi < 1 , the 
real allocation is indeterminate. 
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that consumption and money are substitutes 
(cr > 1 or Uam, < 0 � . T h e n , if the monetary policy is active when ^ + /i > 1 
and /i > 0, the real allocation is indeterminate. If monetary policies is active 
when ^ + /i > 1 but /I <0 (moderately active), there exists a unique perfect-
foresight equilibrium in which the real allocation converges to the steady state. 
On the other hand, if monetary is passive when ^ + < 1, there exists a 
unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the real allocation converges to 
the steady state. 
4 Conclusion 
In the framework of a discrete-time model, we challenge the commonly belief 
that active interest rate feedback rules are desirable for aggregate stability. 
Our model is a discrete-time counterpart of the continuous-time model in 
Benhabib et al. (2001a), but the result is importantly different. We find 
that even if consumption and real balances are definitely complements or sub-
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stitutes, it may still allow for complex equilibrium dynamics. Not only the 
way in which money is assumed to enter preferences but also the “degree of 
activeness” of the monetary policies should be taken into account regarding 
equilibrium determinacy. Specifically, we have uniqueness under active mon-
etary policies but indeterminacy under moderately active policies or passive 
monetary policies when consumption and money are complements. When 
consumption and money are substitutes, equilibrium indeterminacy occurs 
for active monetary policies, while uniqueness arises for moderately active 
policies or passive monetary policies. 
A restriction of our analysis is that it is based on the simplified interest 
rate rules where monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as a linear 
function of the inflation rate. It is favorable to consider alternative interest 
rate rules with output gap. Furthermore, it is important to note that our 
focus is restricted to the local dynamic analysis. The result may not be robust 
to global analysis. For example, Benhabib et al. (2002a) identify a third form 
of instability that may arise under active policy rules. They show that active 
interest rate rules may generate equilibrium cycles of any periodicity and 
even chaos. These equilibria feature trajectories that converge neither to 
the intended steady state nor to and unintended liquidity trap. Rather the 
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Backward-looking Interest Rate 
Feedback Rules 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of backward-looking 
interest rate feedback rules. Using a standard setup on the demand side 
with money in the utility function but with backward-looking contracts on 
the supply side, we show that the results change dramatically in response 
to the interest rate feedback rules. We find that whether active backward-
looking interest rate rules are stabilizing depends on how money enters pref-
erences. In particular, in this sticky price model, indeterminacy occurs under 
both active and passive monetary policies when consumption and money are 




In previous work we focus only on current intertest-rate feedback rules in 
which the argument of the feedback rule is a purely contemporaneous measure 
of inflation as most work on the monetary economics analyses have done. 
In reality, however, inflation may be changing very frequently and possibly 
continuously with time, while the nominal rates, no matter how frequently 
adjusted, may be responding to delayed measures of inflation. Some authors 
have suggested that more appropriate description of monetary policies should 
involve a lag structure. They postulate rules featuring a weighted average of 
past observed inflation rates as the measure of inflation to which the central 
bank responds and have got notable finding that active backward-looking 
feedback rules are stabilizing. For example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000a) 
conclude that to ensure uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium 
the central bank should react aggressively to past inflation rates. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of backward-looking 
interest rate feedback rules on the stability of macroeconomy . Using a 
standard setup on the demand side with money in the utility function and 
with backward-looking contracts on the supply side, we show that whether 
active backward-looking interest rate rules are stabilizing depends on how 
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money is assumed to enter preferences. In particular, in this sticky-price 
model, indeterminacy occurs under both active and passive monetary policies 
when consumption and money are complements. Equilibrium is uniquely 
determined only under extreme condition. This stands in sharp contrast to 
the result in Benhabib, et al. (2001a). They conclude that if the backward-
looking component is sufficiently strong, the equilibrium is always unique 
when monetary policies are active. 
The main difference between our model and theirs lies in the assumption 
of the structure of the backward-looking compoment in monetary policies. 
In their model the nominal interest rate depends on both past and current 
inflation rates, so the stickiness of price implies that the nominal interest 
rate is predetermined. In om, model we follow the price mechanism in Calvo 
and V6gh (1994), where the backward-looking term reflects the wage-setting 
behavior. We assume that, as a result of backward-looking contracts, wages 
were indexed to lagged inflation. The derived expression states that the rate 
of inflation at time i is a weighted average of past inflation rates plus a term 
reflecting the state of excess aggregate demand at time t. This backward-
looking wage indexation scheme provides a channel for the transmission of 
monetary disturbances, thus equilibrium indeterminacy is more likely to 
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occur. 
The organization of this essay is as follows. In the next section we 
describe the basic MIUF model with backward-looking interest rate feedback 
rules. In Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium dynamics. In Section 4 we 
provide the conclusion. 
2 The Model 
Households. - Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical 
infinitely lived households with preferences defined over consumption and real 
balances, and described by the utility function 
fOO 
U = e-P'u(ct, mt)dt (4.1) 
Jo 
where p > 0 denotes the rate of time preference, Ct consumption, rrit 二 
Mt/Pt real balances held by consumers, Mt nominal money balances, and Pt 
the nominal price level. The instantaneous utility function is strictly 
increasing and strictly concave, c and m are normal goods. 
In addition to money, the household can hold nominal bonds, which pay 
the nominal interest rate Rt > 0. Letting at = (Mt + Bt)/Pt denotes the 
51 
household's real financial wealth, Tt real lump-sump taxes, and 7r<； = Pt/Pt 
the inflation rate, the household's instantaneous constraint is 
at = {Rt — 7h)at — Rtmt + yt - ct — n (4.2) 
We assume that output yt is demand-determined (i.e., m equilibrium, 
yt = Ct). Taking as given a � ’ t h e household chooses sequences for c�rrit 
and at to maximize the utility in Equation (4.1) subject to the constraint in 
Euation (4.2) and the following noPonzi-game condition 
- / [R(s)-7r(s)lds 
lim e � at 2 0 (4.3) 
The optimality conditions associated with the household's problem are 
Uc{ct,mt) = Xt (4.4) 
= Rt (4.5) 
A = Xtin + TTt - Rt) (4.6) 
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—/ [R{s)-7v{s)]ds 
lim e ^ 0 Ot = 0 (4.7) 
t—^oo 
where Xt is the co-state variable. 
Log-differentiating Equations (4.4) and (4.5) with respect to t. we obtain 
the following equations 
权cc . ,以cm \ , . 
——Q + — m t = — (4.8) 
Uc Uc Xt 
("^cm权c — '^cc^m \ . , / 以mmMc —权cm以m�. Rt / . 
( )ct + ( )mt = — (4.9) 
Solving Equations (4.8) and (4.9) for q, and by substituting the result 
into Equation (4.6), we get 
1 it 
Ct = — 2 N [['^ vxmUc — UcmUm){p + T^t 一 Rt) — UcmUm-^ ] (4.10) 
[Ucc^mm — '^cm) ^t 
From Equation (4.4), mt can be expressed as a function of consumption 
and the nominal interest rate, 
mt = m{ct, Rt) (4.11) 
On the supply side, along the lines of Calvo and Vegh (1994), we assume 
that the production operates under sticky prices (i.e., the nominal price is 
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given at each point in time), and output is demand-determined. Prices (or 
wages) are assumed to be set according to a backward-looking rule. Specif-
ically, we assume that inflation rate, tt, is set by the following backward-
looking mechanism: 
TTt = cji + e[ct - y) (4.12) 
where y denotes the full-employment output and 9 (> 0) measures the effect 
of excess aggregate demand on inflation. 
The variable cj, which may be interpreted as the growth rate of nominal 
wages, is inherited from the past and evolves over time according to 
^t = - ^ t ) (4.13) 
where 7 is a positive parameter. 
Equation (4.13) states that the growth rate of nominal wages is adjusted 
according to the difference between inflation rate and the current growth 
rate of nominal wages. This captures the backward looking wage indexation 
scheme through which all wages in the formal sector were periodically raised 
to compensate for the cumulative inflation rate of the previous period. 
The implication of this backward-looking setup can be illustrated by the 
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following equation from integration and substitution, 
t 
TTt = 7 j TTs exp[-7(t — s)]ds + e{ct — y) (4.14) 
—oo 
Equation (4.14) indicates that current inflation rate depends on the 
weighted average of past inflation rates tt^  = 7 / Tr^  exp[—7(t — s)]ds -
J —00 
with inflation rates in the recent past receiving the greatest weight - and 
current excess aggregate demand. At any moment in time, only a small 
subset of firms may change their individual prices. The price level and the 
weighted average cf past inflation rates 7rf thus are predetermined variable 
at any given period. But inflation can jump, because it also reflects changes 
in excess demand. When excess demand develops, for instance, some firms 
increase their individual prices and inflation rate rises. Therefore incorporat-
ing the effect of excess aggregate demand into the current inflation measure 
provides a channel for the transmission of monetary disturbances. 
Differentiating Equation (4.12) with respect to t, and making use of Equa-
tion (4.13), we can derive the dynamics equation for the inflation rate 
TTt = je{ct - y ) + ett (4.15) 
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Government. - Following Benhabib, et al. (2001a), we assume that 
the monetary policies take the form of interest rate feedback rules whereby 
the nominal interest rate is set as an increasing function of inflation rate. 
Specifically, 
Rt = R M (4.16) 
where R['Kt) is a continuous, non-decreasing, and strictly positive function 
and there exists at least one tt* > —p such that R('k*) = p + tt*. For active 
monetary policies, R'{7T*) > 1, and for passive monetary policies R'^n*) < 1. 
The government's budget constraint is 
at = (Rt — TTt)at — Rtmt - n (4.17) 
We assume price-neutral fiscal policies that ensure that the present dis-
counted value of total government liabilities converges to zero-that is, Equa-
tion (4.7) is satisfied-under all possible, equilibrium or off-equilibrium, paths 
of endogenous variables such as the price level, the money supply, inflation, 
or the nominal interest rate. 
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics 
In this section we study the dynamics of the system. We show below that 
whether active backward-looking interest rate rules are stabilizing depends 
on how money is assumed to enter preferences. 
With the goods market clear condition Ct = y and by substituting Equa-
tion (4.16) into Equations (410) and (4 .15 ) � we can obtain the following 
dynamic equations of Ct and iTt 
= ( / 二 鎖 严 + 冗-丑⑷—-幻](4.18) 
女t = lO{ct - iO + — ^ ― + R{'K))g — - y)] 
( / + UcmUmO^) 
(4.19) 
where 
f = UccUmm - ul^ > 0 (4.20) 
9 = UmmUc - UcmUm < 0 (4.21) 
Here / > 0, ^ < 0 follows from the concavity and normality assumption of 
the utility function. ^ 
5That m is normal good implies that ^ will be decreasing in m. 
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Linearizing around the steady state izt =7T*, Ct = y^  we have 
Ct an an Q - y 
二 （4.22) 
-kt yO + 9au 6ai2 Th — TT* 
Where 
= f* + tx* ^Mzin ( 4 ! ) 
/ 十以cm以m" 
叱 二 f . + 収 * 収 * e 配 ( 樓 ） J 十以cm収 m 口 i?(7r*) 
By denoting the Jacobian matrix of the system as A, we have 
d e t ( A ) 二 — � a \ 2 
trace{A) = an + 0ai2 
where both signs of det(A) and trace{A) are ambiguous. From Equations 
(4.23) and (4.24) we can see that whether Ucm ^ 0 or Ucm < 0 is important 
to decide the signs of det(A) and trace(A). We undertake a more detailed 
discussion about the equilibrium determinacy for both Ucm ^ 0 and Ucm < 0 
as follows. 
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We first examine the equilibrium dynamics for w 二 � 0 , i.e., when con-
sumption and money are complements or separable: 
In this case if monetary policies are active (R' (tt* ) > 1), then det(A) 
is negative, implying that the system has one positive real root and one 
negative root, or one complex root with positive real part and one with 
negative real part. Since both c and tt are jump variables, it follows that 
there exists a neighborhood around the steady state that for initial Cq and ttq 
in this neighborhood the trajectories for c and tt implied by Equation(4.22) 
converge asymptotically to the steady state. On the other hand, if monetary 
policies are passive {R'{n*) < 1), then det(yl) > 0, trace(A) < 0，the system 
has either two negative real roots or two complex roots with negative real 
parts. Again there is equilibrium indeterminacy for this dynamic system. 
The following proposition summarizes this result. 
Proposition 4.1 When consumption and money are complements or sep-
arable, then under both active and passive monetary policies, there exists a 
continuum of perfect-foresight equilibria in which c and tt converge asymp-
totically to the steady state (y, tt*). 
We next study cases for w*^ < 0, i.e., when consumption and money are 
substitutes. We consider 3 cases separately as things are more complicated: 
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Case 1. When f* + > 0, and R'(7T*) > 1, then we have 
det(74) < 0, equilibrium indeterminacy arises. The following proposition 
summarizes this result. 
Proposition 4.2 When consumption and money are substitutes and 
f* + > 0, then under active monetary 'policies there exists a 
continuum of perfect-foresight equilibria in which c and tt converge asymp-
totically to the steady state (y, n*) 
Case 2. When f* > 0, and R'(y�< 1, we have det{A) > 
0 , the determinacy of the equilibrium depends on the sign of trace{A), which 
is ambiguous. If an > 0 and it dominates, we have trace{A) > 0 , then the 
system have no negative roots, thus there exists a unique perfect-foresight 
equilibria in which c and tt converge to the steady state (j/, tt*). However 
when ail < 0 or an > 0 but ai2，which is negative, dominates, we have 
trace{A) < 0，equilibrium indeterminacy occurs. The following proposition 
summarizes this result. 
Proposition 4.3 When consumption and money are substitutes and f* + 
'^cm'^m^�0’ tfien under passive monetary policies there exist the pos-
sibilities of both uniqueness and equilibrium indeterminacy. 
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Case 3. When f* + 工((二•) < 0，then under active monetary 
policies {R'{n*) > 1), we have det(yl) > 0，trace{A) < 0，equilibrium in-
determinacy arises. While under passive monetary policies {R'[7t*) < 1), 
we have det(yl) < 0, thus equilibrium indeterminacy occurs. The following 
proposition summarizes this result. 
Proposition 4.4 When consumption and money are substitutes and /* + 
< 0，then under both active and passive monetary policies, there 
exists a continuum of perfect-foresight equilibria in which c and tt converge 
asymptotically to the steady state (y, tt*). 
4 Conclusion 
In this essay we identify the restrictions on the backward-looking interest 
rate feedback rules needed to ensure real determinacy. A standard result 
in the literature is that a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy 
is for the monetary authority to react aggressively to past movements in 
inflation. While when we consider more careful stmctural modeling, we find 
that this result does not stand up. In particular, in our model the interest rate 
feedback rules take the form as backward-looking wage indexation schemes, 
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which involve lagged inflation rate and current excess aggregate demand as 
well. The presence of consumption - a jump variable without initial condition 
-destabilizes the economy by generating the possibility of indeterminacy. As 
we have demonstrated, equilibrium is indeterminate under both active and 
passive monetary policies when consumption and money are complements. 
Equilibrium is uniquely determined only under extreme conditions. 
To remain close to the previous literature that advocates the stabilizing 
properties of active backward-looking interest rate feedback rules, we follow 
the widely accepted assumption that the rate of time preference is constant. 
As we have pointed out in Essay I, this modeling strategy is not particularly 
attractive on intuitive grounds. Our work can be extended by incorporating 
endogenous time preference into the model. It would be more complicated 
but more insightful so it is worthy of the efforts. 
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Appendix 
= ( i + � ) # (1) 
Taking logs of both sides in Equation (1) and linearizing around the steady 
state, we do this in the following way: 
+ (2) 
1 十 Z 
l o g � � l o g i * + ^ ^ (3) 
I* � ‘ 
(4) 
nt+i 丄 + TT 
Taking log of LHS of Equation (1), we have 
(1 - Oi){l - cr) ((log(l + it) - log it - log(l + it+i) + b g i � )） 
二 (1 - - a)(log(l + + ^ - logr - ^ 
1 + 2 * 名 * 
= ( 1 普 … 结 + ¥ ) 
二 ( 1 普 … 絲 （5) 
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Substituting Equations (3.14) and (3.15) into Equation (5) to obtain 
(去+ 
(1 -…( 1 一 … 糾 + 兀 * ) ( " +去兀*) 
、(告+ • ^ • i — 兀 * —(兀厂兀*)) … 
二 + + (6) 
Taking log of the RHS of Equation (1), we obtain 
p 
二 /3/u(7rt - TT*) (7) 
~ ( l + T T * ) 
Combining Equations (5) and (7), the following equation holds 
( 1 - … = 时 ( ) ( + 〜一 
(8) 
Thus we have 
TT�-TT* = A{7rt - TT*) (9) 
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where 
“ 1 + ( 1 - … ( , - 碟 (1。） 
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